Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.     

Political risk in private participation projects: The effects of political discretionality and corruption

This article investigates the impact of political risk on the performance of private participation infrastructure projects in emerging markets. Previous studies have shown that firms in regulated sectors are prone to employ political capabilities in their investments overseas. Our analysis of 32,257 projects in 114 emerging countries from 1997 to 2013 shows that higher political discretionality in the host country is negatively associated with project completion. In contrast, a higher level of corruption in the host country is positively associated with project completion. The study makes a contribution to the literature on political risk in foreign direct investments.     

Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms

This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

Analyzing the Memory Impact of Advertising Fragments

Marketers are making increasing use of very brief messages that mention just a brand name or a brand name with a short headline, as in event sponsorship and program endorsements. There has been debate over the effectiveness of these advertising fragments. This paper introduces an approach for controlled testing of the effects of advertising fragments. Using a reaction-time based procedure, we show that a key effect of advertising fragments is to revive established brand associations, even though these associations are not explicitly communicated. This reactivation occurs not only when these names receive focal attention, but also when they receive nonfocal attention.     

减少国有企业代理人腐败的激励契约分析

由于我国国有企业独特的委托—代理关系和其所处的独特政策环境,国有企业的腐败时有发生。解决腐败问题可以从制度安排上着手,也可以从委托代理契约设计着手。从委托人的角度论证良好的契约激励设计将促使委托人加强监督,减少代理人腐败;从代理人角度论证加大激励将减少代理人参与腐败的动机。     

我国养老基金的投资模式

人口老龄化对养老保险制度提出了严峻的挑战 ,“统账结合”的基金缺口将通过国有股减持来弥补。而出于保值增值的需要 ,具有积累或部分积累性质的养老基金有必要进入资本市场 ,并具备了一定的进入条件。相应地 ,养老基金的投资模式也要进行多样化的投资选择 ,以达到保值增值的目的。     

Private-to-private Corruption

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world's leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.